Corbett I
Why Eurosceptics should vote for the Constitution
Richard Corbett is a UK Labour MEP. He was also co-rapporteur for the European Parliament’s report on the European Constitution.
Richard Corbett, I find it sad that much of the debate about the proposed new EU constitution is couched in the usual hyperbole. Eurosceptic parts of the press are already conjuring up fears of an imminent centralised superstate.
A Constitution is the supreme law of a State, which has primacy over the laws of its provinces or regions in any case of conflict. It is the ultimate source of legal authority for the territory it
governs. It is enforced by a Supreme Court, in the EU’s case its Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
Of course, it’s easy to see why those on the extreme right are opposed to the new constitution. There’s much in it to displease them – respect for human rights, respect for minorities, principles of non-discrimination. And so there should be. But what puzzles me is why genuinely moderate eurosceptics should object.
Trying again to define those of us against the Constitution as far right wing. The argument that a Constitution should set out socialist policies is totally flawed in any case, that this constitution does that, is to set in stone today’s thoughts on methods of acceptable government, to show how wrong that is we only need to do is set in stone the political mores of one hundred years ago, to see that if those people had believed they had the right to say all governments that were to follow must accept their definitions of social policy.
On the grand scheme of things, the new constitution doesn’t change much, but those changes it does make are almost exclusively aimed at addressing the most common eurosceptic complaints. It emphasises yet again that the European Union is a voluntary association of co-operating states, with only those responsibilities that its members unanimously choose to give it. Surely, not even the most ardent anti-Europeans could object to that!
The Constitution abolishes national control in nearly 30 new policy areas. They include civil and criminal law and procedures, asylum and immigration, Europol and Eurojust, energy, structural
funds, commercial treaties dealing with services, culture.
Actually the Constitution changes everything, it turns upside down the power flow, now it is from the member states to the Union when the EU is reformed its authority will not come from the members but from the constitution itself. In fact the constitution gives very little power to act independently to the member states and even in those areas of power that remain, the government must operate under the umbrella of the EU, and each area that the states have agreed not to allow the union to operate are under constant threat and are only temporary, as Gisela Stewartsaid and
It gives more power to the European institutions but does not make those institutions more accountable to voters It is also far from clear that the principle that national governments should continue to be in charge of policy-making unless these policies would be better handled at European level is being respected, the draft document from my experience at the Convention it is clear that the real reason for the Constitution – and its main impact – is the political deepening of the Union.
It will be difficult to amend and will be subject to interpretation by the European Court of Justice. And if it remains in its current form, the new Constitution will be able to create powers for itself. It cannot be viewed piecemeal; its sum is more than its parts.
This Constitution is unusual in that it also initiates processes for future development with the aim of deeper and ever closer integration. Where integration can be deepened no further, this text has rigid rules as for example in the list of exclusive competences of the Commission. Power at the centre cannot be returned to Member States. Where the political climate means that certain ideas for further integration are not yet acceptable, the Draft Constitution creates the structure for a process to develop later. An example of this is defence and foreign policy.
Corbett has written a rebuttal of Stewarts claims (Same link as above) but as she, not him, was a member of the Presidium, I know who I would prefer to believe on what happened during their deliberations.
As far as his take on the Constitution itself well if the following is anything to go by then I thing a quick look at the document will show his views are just that views with no substance “It stokes up the hoary myth that the EU is about centralisation, but as she well knows, the draft constitution does not transfer any new fields of responsibility from national to European level. Rather, it increases the accountability of the European institutions to member states and to citizensâ€
In general, the new constitution contains a set of modest but worthwhile improvements to the current constitution of the EU (the existing set of overlapping treaties). It does three main things:
• streamline decision-making to prevent gridlock in an enlarged EU;
• introduce greater democratic safeguards;
• clarify the nature and aims of the Union.
It makes it easier for the EU to override any objections which of course does prevent gridlock,
“The Constitution, and law adopted by the Union’s Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.”
A relevant point here is that EU governments accepted the ECJ’s assertion of the primacy of EU law in the 1960s, when the then EEC dealt with a far narrower range of issues than the EU does today. It is one thing for Member States go along with a principle established by the EU Court and applied to a restricted range of matters like customs duties or tariffs. It is quite another to
concede national sovereignty to an EU Constitution whose writ covers everything from tax policy to criminal law to foreign policy and fundamental human rights.
So much for the broad outline, which is hardly controversial. It’s when you look at the detail of these provisions that it becomes clear just how many traditional eurosceptic criticisms are addressed.
They complain about apparent lack of democracy. So the constitution now gives the directly elected European Parliament control over all aspects of the EU budget. The adoption of EU legislation will be subject to the prior scrutiny of national parliaments and the dual approval of both national governments (in the Council) and the directly elected European Parliament - a level of parliamentary scrutiny that exists in no other international structure. The exercise of delegated powers by the Commission will be brought under a new system of supervision by the European Parliament and the Council, enabling each of them to call back Commission decisions to which they object.
Directly elected but on what mandate? Richard North has already blown a great big hole in this particular argument…
“mandate†in this context is interesting. It is generally held to mean the sanction given by electors to members of parliament to deal with a question before the country. In other words, the candidates for the election set out their stalls, the electors look at the rival offerings and choose between them.
In national elections, this choice has some validity because the winning party – or coalitions – go on to form a government, which then (in theory at least) executes the voters’ mandate. But in the European parliament, this cannot happen.
For a start, the election does not produce a government, so the parliament has no power or authority to execute a mandate. It cannot, for instance, decide to repeal any EU laws – it cannot even initiate any laws. Those powers lie elsewhere. Therefore, the candidates – or the parties they represent – cannot produce manifestos in any meaningful sense of the word, as they have no means by which they can deliver on promises made.
Furthermore, in a parliament of 732 members, Britain elects only 78 MEPs, and then from different parties. But even if all were from one party and were clearly set on one course of action, they do not have the numbers to dictate terms. Even as a united bloc, they are swamped by the members from other member states.
Therein lies one of the central defects of the European parliament. The essence of a parliamentary system is that it is the core of a system of representative democracy, where the members go to parliament to represent their electors’ views (and safeguard their interests). But British MEPs cannot represent the interests of their electors – there are not enough of them to do so.
Furthermore – and this strikes at the heart of the concept of a supranational parliament – there is no commonality of interest in the peoples of the member states that would enable discrete blocs to emerge that could be adequately represented by a multi-national coalition of MEPs. In other words, there is no European demos and, without that, there can be no European democracy.
An ‘emergency brake’ is introduced, enabling national governments to block majority decisions in certain sensitive areas if they consider it to be of national importance.
No such power exits there is no blocking power available to the Member states.
They complain about lack of transparency. So the constitution now insists that the Council of Ministers should always meet in public when legislating, meaning that no laws will be enacted behind closed doors.
But there is no openness about the Commissions proposals no way of opposing them.
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