I am often so flabbergasted at the BBC blatant bias that it takes me a while to wake up, not the case with Eureferendum title “Beneath Contempt†which mentions last night “Newsnight programme, a report on the UN “Oil for Food” scandal. In what was supposed to be a critical piece, we heard Peter Marshall, the Beebie reporter state, with not a hint of a blush:
The Asian tsunami has provided a perfect example of the need for an effective UN under an activist Secretary General. This time Kofi Annan was quick off the mark and America’s independent efforts soon looked superfluous.â€
Looking at the comments section F U ( Fed Up) posts a link to The Australian News
In the aftermath of the Asian tsunamis, the US had acted quickly to assemble a core group of four countries to co-ordinate aid.
The core group, which consisted of the US, Australia, Japan and India, has since been disbanded, with the UN assuming its co-ordinating role. But the untold inside story of the short life of the core group reveals one of the most elegant exercises in foreign policy in recent times.
Its formation tells us much about the Bush administration, its ability to react quickly when necessary, its geostrategic priorities and its intimate relationship with Australia.
The US response to the tsunamis was far from slow, as some critics have alleged. When the magnitude-9.0 quake struck off the coast of Sumatra, triggering a series of powerful tsunamis on the morning of Sunday, December 26, it was mid-evening on Christmas night in Washington.
Yet within six hours, the US Agency for International Development was moving relief funds to US embassies in the region. According to senior US officials, it was natural and automatic that Australia was the first and most important interlocutor on this crisis.
The US Pacific Command, based in Hawaii, was in touch with its Australian counterparts straight away. Pacific commander Admiral Thomas Fargo was quickly on the phone to Australia’s General Peter Cosgrove.
In Washington, senior staff of the State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council, who had not taken Christmas leave, were called back to their offices.
There followed a series of telephone conferences to discuss the immediate response as the proposal for the core group, credited to Under-Secretary of State for political affairs Marc Grossman, took shape.
Grossman would in due course become the US convenor of the group.
As these staff discussions were going on, US officials periodically kept key Australian diplomats informed.
Thus Australia, from the outset, was able to have an input into the inter-agency process, the fruits of the new Australian intimacy in Washington.
The core-group concept was formalised in a phone call between National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Powell asked Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to ring the Australian ambassador to the US, Michael Thawley, and Japanese ambassador, Ryozo Kato, to get the ball rolling.
Armitage rang Thawley on Monday December 27. Powell himself spoke directly to Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer.
The ease and familiarity of these relationships is critical in a fast-moving process like this.
Thawley has become a Washington powerbroker in his own right, regularly talking to Armitage. Unlike other ambassadors from the region, he also talks a lot to Karl Rove, Bush’s chief domestic adviser.
Downer has been Foreign Minister for all the time that Powell has been Secretary of State and the two are friends.
Senior US officials insist that the highest priority was effectiveness, enrolling countries that could deliver and do so fast.
“We were interested in countries that could do the ‘mostest’ the fastest,” says a senior US official. “We weren’t trying to make any big political point here.”
Nonetheless, a political point was made. Paul Martin, the Canadian Prime Minister, rang Bush to complain about being left out.
Blair told Bush that co-ordination should go through the UN and the G8.
But the truth was that the UN had no capacity to do anything or to make any difference in the short term.
On December 27, late in the evening, Washington time, the core group had its first teleconference with Grossman in the chair. Australia participated through Doug Chester, the acting head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The other participants were Japan and India. The meeting went very well.
Every day, until the group was wound up late last week, another long-distance conference would be held.
The four nations worked easily together, all committing their armed forces to deliver the aid as quickly as possible.
On December 31, the core group held a video-conference, involving Powell and the UN’s Kofi Annan and various senior UN officials. The core group meetings after this routinely included UN representatives.
“This was an opportunity for the US and the UN to kiss and make up,” says a senior US official. Another core- group official has a more blunt view: “All this talk about UN capability is crap. The core-group countries had forces steaming to the crisis while the UN was still on holidays.”
The core group was a classic example of focused, regional multilateralism, not initially involving the UN, centred on a real task.
Although the US priority was helping victims and saving lives, senior figures, such as Powell and Armitage, saw the duty, the opportunity and the risk for the US.
The US made tsunami relief an exceptionally high priority, even to the extent of deploying units that were meant to be heading for Iraq, according to some sources. In total, the US, Australian and Japanese military forces committed the greatest concentration of military power in Southeast Asia since the Vietnam War.
Australia’s contribution has received exceptional coverage in the US. Both The New York Times and the Washington Post ran front page photos of Australian soldiers helping tsunami victims while an unofficial internet site run by US diplomats sang the praises of the Australians.
Countless newspapers and television news programs ran graphics showing Australia as the outstanding contributor of tsunami aid.
The tsunami relief effort reached a political climax with the summit in Jakarta on January 6. The Australian Government urged the Bush administration to consider having the President attend himself. But while it would have been an enormous gesture for
Bush to go personally to Jakarta, it would have been a massive logistical exercise, diverting Indonesian security and military resources from the relief effort. So, instead, Bush sent Powell, the most internationally popular member of his cabinet, and his brother, Florida Governor Jeb Bush. This personalised Bush’s response in a way that was well understood in Asia.
And so, its work done, the core group was wound up. The lessons of this extraordinary chapter in international co-operation are now being studied in chanceries around the world. Greg Sheridan
Contrast this with a letter in the Yorkshire Post Eureferendumfrom Ged Robinson a leading light in the Leeds branch of the European Movement.
Who claims he has written to rebut many letters that criticise the EU and our membership of it,
“I thought I would give some details of the EU’s role in the response to the humanitarian disaster in Asia.â€
Which boils down to no immediate response but an ongoing Assessment and evaluation of the situation? After which this idiot seems by some unimaginable leap of faith pleases to conclude that
“Yet again, in response to an international catastrophe, we see why we are members of a pan-European partnership such as the EU. We can achieve more together than we can aloneâ€
How is it that they simply cannot make any comment without misleading? Not only on the facts, but what on earth is a pan-European partnership? Some equal joint venture where we all equally loose sovereignty to a pan European unaccountable and unelected EU run by and undemocratic “conclave of technocrats without a country, responsible to nobody.”