eurealist.co.uk

Hoewel ik ben een atheïst en staan meestal niet betrekking op mijzelf met religie, ik was op zoek naar een andere blog verband te houden met de onderneming Cranmer toen vond ik dit citaat voor een post over Halloween op een Getuige blog.

Dank God! Ik heb eindelijk wakker om te zien dat Halloween is zo'n grote kans voor evangelisatie. Welke andere tijd van het jaar gaan mensen werkelijk koppel aan mijn deur?

De Christen evangelisatie Wimpy getuige blog

Nee alleen Grapje!
Italië doet een beroep op EU over fusie en stelt dat Europa is dood

De Franse fusie van Suez SA en Gaz de France wordt gezegd dat dit leidt tot consternatie in Italië. Een redactioneel in de WSJ betoogt dat de Franse â € œhead-on uitdaging voor de interne markt de vraag doet rijzen de raison da € ™ être achter de Europese Unie veel meer dan de constitutionele crisis van vorig jaar did.â € vice-voorzitter Franco Frattini â € œWhat is gebeurd in Parijs risico's omgaan een klap toe aan de Europese geest van de interne market.â €

Echter In Frankrijk hebben een ander perspectief:

Het was een daad van â € œeconomic patriotismâ € (Dominique de Villepin)

Economisch patriottisme is niet hetzelfde als het protectionisme (Clara GAYMARD uit Invest in Frankrijk)

â € œeverything komen die de Franse industrie ten goede komt aan de hele Europe.â € (Franse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) dat een goede vraag ik me af of het zou het werk moeten onze Tone in de verleiding om te proberen het?

Dankzij Dennis Cooper voor deze twee rare letters.

Dit verwijst naar een artikel van Bill Jamieson vorige week: "Britse beleid afgrond: de officiële cijfers en de echte wereld": Link

"Weinig denk nu dat de CPI-inflatie maatregel draagt sterk gerelateerd aan de kosten van levensonderhoud. Immers, hoe kan het als de CPI omvat geen huisvesting of hypotheek, de belastingen, nationale verzekeringen, belastingen of raad? "

Koppelen

26 februari 2006

Sir â € "die ik wil delen heb ik een formule voor het verslaan van de winter blues. Het is een van de herkomst van die draagt het keurmerk van de intellectuele en financiële integriteit van de hoogste orde. Simpel, kies ik te geloven dat de conclusies van die augustus leden van het Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) die beweren dat de economie trekt aan, en alles wat rozengeur en maneschijn is. Hoe is het geruststellend te weten dat irritante kleine uitgaven zoals hypotheek betalingen, inkomstenbelasting, sociale bijdragen en fiscale raad geen deel uitmaken van hun denken. Reden dat ik zo niet een deel van hen vervolgens waarom zouden ze deel uitmaken van de mijne?

Ik stopte verontrustend, gingen op een feestelijke uitgaven boemel en kreeg enkele geweldige koopjes bij een aantal High Street sluiten van de verkoop. Mijn bank manager, hoewel op het eerste lijkt een beetje erop gezet, niet zozeer als werkelijk eens op aangedrongen dat al mijn automatische incasso moet onmiddellijk worden gestopt. Het toont gewoon aan wat slimme heren die MPC-leden zijn.

Pauline Roberts, Cardiff --

Koppelen

Wat de inflatie?

26 februari 2006

Sir â € "Onder verwijzing naar uw artikelen over het verschil tussen de â € œcost van livingâ € en het Verenigd Koninkrijk Consumer Price Index (CPI), ik herinner me mijn tijd studeren monetaire economie aan de London School of Economics in het midden van de jaren 1980.

Een van mijn leraren gebruikt om te zeggen dat als hij ooit in de controle van het monetair beleid, het beste beleid zou zijn om de rente zo laag mogelijk terwijl altijd ontkennen het bestaan van eventuele inflatie. Ik vraag me af of zijn instincten zijn veranderd nu dat hij de controle over het monetaire beleid.

William Butler --

Brieven aan de redacteur

The Times 23 februari 2006

De hervorming van de wetgeving Bill bevoegdheden toekent, te groot voor de overheid
Sir Francis Bennion is juist de aandacht vestigen in zijn brief aan de mislukking â € "van opeenvolgende regeringen â €" te doen om wetgeving uit te voeren verstandige wet hervormingen aanbevolen door de wet Commissie. Wat moet echter worden aangetekend dat de â € œdifficulty bij het verkrijgen van een plaats in het wetgevend programma voor de hervorming ervan Billsâ € is grotendeels te wijten aan de voorkeur van regeringen (met name de huidige versie) in te voeren â € œpopularâ € maatregelen, vaak onder de mantra van â € œmodernisationâ €, maar die doen weinig om effect echte verandering.

Het is niet alleen het wetgevings-en Regulatory Reform Bill (Comment, Feb 21; letters, 16 februari en 20) toont aan dat een arrogantie van de kant van de overheid te omzeilen of spoorweg Parlement. Tony Blair gevraagd te rechtvaardigen, in Prime Ministerâ € ™ s Vragen van vorige week, het herstel van een misdrijf van â € œglorifying terrorismâ € aan de Terrorism Bill op basis van het feit dat we â € œif verwijder elke verwijzing naar de verheerlijking van de Bill, mensen van buiten zal afleiden dat we besloten hebben om af aan ons recht op een moment waarop we moeten versterken en dat ita € â € œby verzwakking van onze wetgeving op het gebied van terrorisme op dit moment uit wat werd voorgesteld, zouden we een verkeerd signaal geven het geheel van de buiten worldâ € .

Betekent dit dat als de regering voor een nieuwe wet, echter slecht getimed of autoritair zijn, is het de morele plicht van het Parlement te steunen uit angst voor de â € het œwrong signalâ € zou sturen het niet anders? Gelukkig zijn de voorgestelde 90 dagen detentie wet is vastgelegd, maar er is een voortdurende behoefte aan onze parlementsleden eraan te herinneren dat de prijs van vrijheid is eeuwige waakzaamheid.

DAVID J. pak slaag
Groton, Suffolk

Geachte heer, mevrouw, De regering heeft ons verzekerd dat de zeer ruime bevoegdheden te geven aan de ministers door het wetgevings-en Regulatory Reform Bill om wetgeving door middel van een wettelijk instrument zal niet gebruikt worden voor controversiële onderwerpen.

Het is goed te beseffen dat wanneer de European Communities Act was gepasseerd, de toenmalige advocaat-generaal zei dat het Europees Parlement op 13 juli 1972, dat de soortgelijke bevoegdheden in deel 2 (2) van die wet zou worden gebruikt voor â € œconsequential wijzigingen van een kleine , De minderjarige en onbetekenend Kinda €. Echter, deze bevoegdheden worden gebruikt om fundamentele veranderingen in onze wet, waarbij belangrijke beleidskeuzes, zonder een beroep te doen op een wet van het Parlement. Een recent voorbeeld is de beoogde uitvoering door regulering van het EG-richtlijn inzake leeftijdsdiscriminatie. Ondanks dat deze richtlijn laat een ruime discretionaire bevoegdheid van de lidstaten geformuleerd, waarvan de uitoefening gevolgen zal hebben voor de samenleving als geheel en miljoenen mensen persoonlijk, de richtlijn wordt geïmplementeerd door regelgeving.

Wat het gebruik van sectie 2 (2) van de European Communities Act laat zien is dat elke overheid, geconfronteerd met de moeilijkheid om voldoende tijd te krijgen Parlementaire zijn wetgeving via onvermijdelijk zullen ervoor kiezen om andere routes sneller wanneer ze beschikbaar zijn. Zoals Lord Justice Jacob zei in het recente geval van Oakley v Animal kan niemand serieus suggereren dat de toetsing Parlement geeft op de wettelijke instrumenten is net zo diep als die gegeven is aan een Act of Parliament.

Ongeacht de Governmentâ € ™ s goede bedoelingen, daarom is het moeilijk te hebben veel vertrouwen in dat de bevoegdheden van de regering nu wil rekening zal niet worden gebruikt om in de fundamentele veranderingen die adequaat moeten worden in het Parlement besproken.

SIR JEREMY LEVER, QC
GEORGE Peretz
Londen WC1

Deze uit Neil Herron

Burnley Raad ... formele brief waarin de Bill of Rights, Magna Carta en de Human Rights Act

Zoals we nu beginnen met de invoering van de mensenrechtencommissie vooruitzichten NPAS DPE en is op zoek inderdaad erg kwetsbaar.

Juridische Dienst
Burnley Borough Council
Stadhuis
Burnley
BB11 1JA

Geachte meneer / mevrouw

Ik schrijf met betrekking tot een uiteindelijke vraag uit Drakes Gerechtsdeurwaarders, gedateerd op 14/2/06 (kopie bijgevoegd) voor 2 onbetaald parkeren boete mededelingen dd 1/2/05 en 19/5/05. De straf aankondigingen zijn: BE ******** en BE ********. Ik kan bevestigen dat ik een brief aan Parkwise op 11 juli vorig jaar en betwistte de geldigheid van deze kaartjes als er geen afzonderlijke onderneming heeft het recht om te eisen geld van mij om een vermeend strafbaar feit dat niet bewezen heeft in een rechtbank.

Zoals vermeld in de Bill of Rights Act 1689 formeel vastgesteld en trad in statuten na de Verklaring van de Rechten 1689:

Dat alle subsidies en beloftes van boetes en forfeitures van bepaalde personen vóór overtuiging is onwettig en nietig.

Zoals aangegeven door Parkwise ze geen probleem boetes, maar Penalty Charge bekendmakingen. Maar volgens Burnley Borough Raden officiële website (Burnley.gov.uk), ze doen afgifte boetes en is duidelijk opgenomen in het AZ van de diensten van de Raad (kopie bijgevoegd). Daarom lijkt het dat Burnley Borough Council en haar agenten (Parkwise) hebben geen wettig gezag te eisen geld voor een vermeende inbreuk op dat nog niet werd behandeld door een rechtbank.

Van de Bill of Rights, dat moet ik erop wijzen dat de tekst van de Bill of Rights stelt duidelijk genoeg dat er geen boetes of forfeitures kunnen worden opgelegd voordat het proces van het vonnis en de overtuiging, en deze tekst geeft duidelijk aan dat een rechtbank is vereiste voor het oplossen van geschillen van welke aard dan ook, hetzij burgerlijke of strafzaken.

Omdat beslissingen betrokken zijn bij de considerans van de Bill of Rights, alsmede veroordelingen. Het is volkomen duidelijk dat alleen HM rechtbanken beschikken over de wettelijke bevoegdheid tot het opleggen van wettige beslissingen en / of overtuigingen. Voorts kan, met de exacte woorden van de Bill of Rights terdege van bewust en ik moet met u opnemen dat de bepalingen van de Bill of Rights niet kan worden voldaan door een proces van het beroep op elke andere locatie dan HM rechtbanken!.
In een woord in de verklaring van de rechten bepaalt dat indien Burnley Borough Council wil procederen tegen me, ze zullen hebben om deze kwestie aan Her Majesty's Courts Service, waar de problemen moeten worden opgelost op een wettige manier. Anders is de verbeurd eiste van mij is onwettig en nietig.

In aanvulling op de bepalingen van de Verklaring en Bill of Rights, en ter ondersteuning van mijn stelling dat dit proces niet gevormd in overeenstemming met onze wetten, moet ik u vragen om erkenning van het Handvest van Groot Onze vrijheden die nu is omgezet in de statuten Recht onder de naam van de Magna Carta. Vestig ik uw bijzondere aandacht te schenken aan de bepalingen van de artikelen 39 & 40 van het Statuut, dat luidt als volgt: --

39. Geen vrij man wordt gearresteerd of gevangen, of beroofd van zijn bezittingen, of verboden of verbannen, of op enigerlei andere wijze vernietigd, noch zullen wij ingaan tegen hem of tegen hem verzenden, tenzij door juridische uitspraak van zijn leeftijdsgenoten, of door de recht van het land.

40. Als er niemand die wij verkopen, aan niemand zullen we weigeren of vertragen, het recht of de rechter.

Er kan geen twijfel over dat ik een vrij man is en dat de artikelen 39 en 40 van toepassing op mij. Het is duidelijk en zeer goed opgenomen dat het hele doel van Magna Carta was een vermindering van de macht van de koning en niet te verhogen en deze macht als gevolg van de zeer duidelijk, het is duidelijk dat de optie van een proef door het arrest van mijn collega's Of door de wet van het land is een optie die is beveiligd tegen me in alle omstandigheden als de onderhavige, en niet een optie die kan worden uitgeoefend door of op aanwijzing van de Kroon, of door enige autoriteit die beweert dat het bezit zijn van een autoriteit op grond van de Kroon.

Bijvoorbeeld de Local Authority waarmee ik mezelf vinden in het geding zijn.

In aanvulling op de bepalingen van de Verklaring en Bill of Rights, en de Magna Carta. Ik wil graag uw aandacht vestigen op de Human Rights Act 1998, inzonderheid op artikel 6 (Recht op een eerlijk Trail), en de bepalingen in paragraaf 1: --

1. Bij het vaststellen van zijn burgerlijke rechten en verplichtingen of van enige tenlastelegging tegen hem, iedereen heeft recht op een eerlijke en openbare behandeling binnen een redelijke termijn, door een onafhankelijk en onpartijdig gerecht dat bij wet. De beoordeling wordt publiekelijk uitgesproken, maar de pers en het publiek kan worden uitgesloten van alle of een deel van het proces in het belang van de goede zeden, de openbare orde of nationale veiligheid in een democratische samenleving, wanneer de belangen van minderjarigen of de bescherming van het prive-leven van de dit eisen of, voor zover dat strikt noodzakelijk is naar het oordeel van het hof onder speciale omstandigheden, wanneer de openbaarheid zou afbreuk doen aan het belang van de rechtspleging.

Ik heb nog niet een beroep op de Nationale parkeergelegenheid Adjudication Service. The Independent Tribunal dat 60p ontvangt van elke straf uitgegeven, en wordt gefinancierd door de lokale overheid het verzamelen van de PCN. Het bewijs van de inmiddels opgenomen en openbare bekentenissen van de Nationale Parkeren en Adjudication Service dient nu te onthullen dat het proces van dit tribunaal systeem wordt deels gefinancierd uit de middelen van mijn tegenstander, en deze toelating leidt tot de onvermijdelijke conclusie dat elke dergelijke hoorzitting niet is gevestigd op een wijze die onafhankelijk is van de belangen van mijn tegenstander.

Ik ben dan ook het verzoek dat Burnley Borough Council schorst het bevel uit Drakes Gerechtsdeurwaarders, zoals ik van plan om een late Wettelijke verklaring met de Traffic Enforcement Center.

Het is mijn bedoeling om mijn zaak te verdedigen door middel van de rechtbanken van HM de Koningin, zoals de Verklaring van de Rechten 1689, de Magna Carta 1215, en de Human Rights Act 1998 is bepaald dat heb ik een onvervreemdbaar recht om te eisen dat al en de eventuele juridische acties ondernomen tegen mij, of civiele of strafrechtelijke worden gehoord en opgelost door een rechtbank die opereert in naam en voor de toepassing van de Koningin.
Dat is de reden waarom de Koninklijke Blazoen wordt weergegeven in elke rechtszaal.

Ik kijk uit van u te horen in deze kwestie.

Hoogachtend.

Neil Corless.

Wie wil de afschaffing van het Parlement Bill?
David Howarth

Vrijwel niemand heeft gemerkt, maar de Britse democratie is slaapwandelen in een duistere wereld van de ministeriële bevoegdheid.

LAATSTE WEEK alle ogen waren op het House of Commons als het debat over identiteitskaarten, roken en terrorisme. De media melden zowel wat parlementsleden gezegd en hoe er gestemd werd. Voor een week ten minste de Commons belang was.

Des te meer vreemd dan dat de vorige donderdag, in een bijna verlaten kamer, de regering voorgesteld een buitengewone Bill die zullen drastisch verminderen parlementaire bespreking van toekomstige wetten, een Bill enkele grondwettelijke deskundigen zijn al bellen â € œthe Afschaffing van het Parlement Billa €.

Een paar journalisten opgevallen, waaronder Daniel Finkelstein van The Times, en nog een paar extra geprikt hun oren toen ik vorige week een aantal bijten academische kritiek op de wet betreffende de letters pagina van deze krant. Maar naast die ijle kringen, dat we slaapwandelen in een nieuwe en duistere wereld van de ministeriële bevoegdheid lijkt nauwelijks te hebben geregistreerd.

De saaie titel van het wetgevings-en Regulatory Reform Bill verbergt een verbazingwekkend voorstel. Het geeft ministers de macht te wijzigen van een wet door het parlement. De enige beperkingen zijn dat nieuwe strafbare feiten kan niet worden gemaakt indien de straf groter is dan twee jaar in de gevangenis en dat het niet kan verhogen belastingen. Maar elke andere wet kan worden veranderd, het maakt niet uit hoe belangrijk. Alle ministers zullen moeten doen, is voor een bestelling, wacht een paar weken, en voila, de wet wordt gewijzigd.

Voor de ministers de voordelen zijn duidelijk: niet meer saaie debatten waarin ze een antwoord moeten geven op lastige vragen. In plaats van een volledige nadiia € ™ s debat over het principe van het voorstel, gedetailleerde line-by-line onderzoek in de commissie, een tweede kans op specifieke wijziging in de Commons en een afsluitend debat en de stemming, zijn de ministers te maken krijgt met ten hoogste een kort debat in de commissie en een een-en-een-half uur durende debat over de vloer.

Vaak wordt de regering zal worden geconfronteerd met minder dan dat. Geen wijzigingen zullen worden toegestaan. Het wetgevingsproces zal worden teruggebracht tot een spel van take-it-or-verlof-it.
De wet vervangt een bestaande wet die het mogelijk maakt de ministers voor het verlichten van administratieve lasten. Business was enthousiast over dat principe en de regering lijkt te hebben overtuigd dat de lobby van het bedrijfsleven, dat de jongste Bill is gewoon een nieuwe, verbeterde versie. Wat maakt de nieuwe wet anders is echter niet alleen dat het mogelijk maakt de regering om extra regelgeving, met inbegrip van nieuwe misdaden, maar ook het feit dat de ministers tot wijziging van de structuur van de overheid zelf. Er kunnen mensen uit het bedrijfsleven zozeer gehecht aan het begrip efficiëntie en zo onwetend of smalend van de beginselen van de democratie dat ze vinden een dergelijke propositie aantrekkelijk. Gewone burgers moeten vinden het verontrustend.

Elke instantie gecreëerd door middel van statuten, waaronder lokale overheden, de rechtbanken en zelfs bedrijven, kunnen zich bevinden gereorganiseerd of zelfs afgeschaft. Omdat de bevoegdheden van het House of Lords zijn omschreven in de Handelingen van het Parlement, ook zij worden onderworpen aan de Bill.

Terugkijkend op het afgelopen weekâ € ™ s in de Commons, de Bill is een aanfluiting van de parlementsleden beslissingen nam. Carrying ID-kaarten zou kunnen worden gesteld, roken in oneâ € ™ s eigen huis kan worden verboden en de definitie van terrorisme gewijzigd dat de gewone politiek protest is strafbaar met levenslange gevangenisstraf. Evenmin zal de Human Rights Act ons redden, aangezien het wetsontwerp maakt geen uitzondering voor.

De Bill, bizar, zelfs niet van toepassing op zichzelf, zodat de ministers orders zou kunnen voorstellen om de beperkingen ongeveer twee jaar straf en belastingen. Het bevat ook een paar vluchtig vragen (naar het voorbeeld van â € œam ik tevreden dat ik het juiste ding te doen? Â €) hebben de ministers zich af te vragen voordat u doorgaat, worden alle subjectief opgesteld, zodat de rechter uitdagingen zal falen, ongeacht hoe absurd het is ministerâ € ™ antwoord. Zelfs op deze vragen kan worden verwijderd met behulp van de Billa € ™ s eigen procedure. Sterker nog, bij de meest extreme, in een maneuver een wetgevings-lijkend op het koorden Indiase truc, ministers kon gebruiken om alle wetgevende macht definitief naar zichzelf.

De Bill fundamentele vragen doet rijzen over de rol van het Parlement. Ministers, egged op een aantal verdachte, de Civil Service, voor de behandeling van het Parlement als een stemmachine. Haar werk, in hun visie, is louter juridische dekking te geven aan wat de ministers willen doen. Ze behandelen debat en de beraadslaging als eenvoudige chatter voor de uiterst belangrijke stemming. Ze zien geen groot verschil tussen de volledige parlementaire procedure en de procedure voor een partiële de wettelijke instrumenten, omdat ze voor hen het resultaat hoger of gelijk is, dat de ministers ontvangen wettelijke basis voor hun plannen. Net als een perfecte strafrechtelijk statuut van de ministers blijkt een waar alles is onwettig, zodat aanklagers zijn discretionaire bevoegdheid om iemand in voor een rechtbank, een perfecte machtiging is een statuut dat maakt legale elk ministerieel besluit of het beleid.

Sommigen van ons hebben een andere mening toegedaan. Wij denken dat beraadslaging en discussie onderwerp, dat zij deel uitmaken van de parlementaire democratie wat maakt het werk en maken de nieuwe wetten passeren we legitiem. Beraadslaging verbetert de wetgeving, maar nog belangrijker is, het dwingt regeringen om de redenen op te geven voor hun voorstellen die verder gaan dan hun eigenbelang in het spel. In particuliere bijeenkomsten van de regerende partij, of in het kabinet, of vooral in telefonische gesprekken tussen ministers en de bijzondere adviseurs, puur partijdig redenen kunnen prevaleren. Maar in het openbaar, met name wanneer er sprake is echt debat, ministers te bieden hebben redenen die zouden kunnen overhalen anderen. Als ze kunnen niet denken van al deze redenen, hun schaamte bedwingt hen. Zoals de politieke wetenschapper Jon Elster zegt, zelfs hypocriet kan een beschavende werking.

De regering beweert dat er niets zorgen hoeven te maken. De bevoegdheden in het wetsvoorstel, volgens haarzelf, niet zullen worden gebruikt voor
â € œcontroversialâ € aangelegenheden. Maar er is niets in het wetsvoorstel dat het gebruik ervan derhalve beperkt tot â € œuncontroversialâ € kwesties. De minister vraagt ons hem te vertrouwen, en, erger nog, het vertrouwen van al zijn collega's en al hun opvolgers. Niemand mag worden vertrouwd met dergelijke macht.

Zoals James Madison waarschuwing gaf in The Federalist Papers, we mogen niet vergeten wanneer met het uitdelen van politieke macht die â € œenlightened staatslieden zal niet altijd op de Helma €. Dit wetsvoorstel moet maken een twijfel of ze nu aan het roer nu.

David Howarth is liberaal-democraat MP voor Cambridge en Reader in de Rechten aan de Universiteit van Cambridge

Op zaterdag heb ik nagegaan in Eurealist gecontroleerd en geconstateerd dat de blog had beschadigd raken, geen probleem hoor ik u beiden huilen, net herladen van uw back-up kopie van de sjabloon en je zult up and running in no time, Een wat! Oh ja, ik heb een back-up van het sjabloon enkele maanden geleden Oeps! Dus ik heb mucking over met de sjabloon, uiteindelijk heb ik heb het soort gesorteerd, hoop ik. Ik nam de gelegenheid om opnieuw te beoordelen mijn blog aanbiedingen, sommige niet meer werkte, anderen waren gestaakt te worden bijgewerkt, ook zijn er een paar nieuwe, ik heb toegevoegd.

Niet Little England volledige naam Groot-Brittannië niet Little England is een dergelijke, ik weet niet waarom ik nog niet een link in voor, maar ik doe eigenlijk, het is dezelfde reden waarom kon ik het maken van een back-up van het sjabloon, mijn vrouw noemt het luiheid Hu!

Ik weet werkelijk niet wat Shea € ™ s weer over, ik bedoel ik werkte op de sjabloon in mijn mooie warme kantoor met een glas wijn naast me gisteravond stilte genieten ze was zichzelf, versluiering over in het kader van de Mahonia? bush in het ijskoud rodding de riolering (de Dames lo weer verstopt was geworden).

Anyway MatGB ten Little England startte onlangs met een blog verkeer te verdringen deze regering, een coalitie van bereidwilligen om onze gevaarlijk autoritaire regering. Ik ben blij dat ik steun dit lovenswaardig streven, maar wel waarschuwen dat removeing deze regering zal op zichzelf niet leiden tot een omkering van het autoritaire beleid van de TB GB mob. Nee we moeten hier heel specifiek is dat we de bevolking van Groot-Brittannië hebben zo ongeveer een autoritair genoeg duurt een hele tijd moeten we ervoor dat heel duidelijk tegen degenen die zouden staan in Blairâ € ™ s schoenen en we mogen niet toestaan onszelf te worden afgescheept met zoete woorden uit afgestemde tongen.

Een van de blog een lijst met aanvullingen is Gav `s Politics, Gav` s nemen betreffende de Coalition of the Willing is de moeite waard te kopiëren, omdat hij onder woorden brengen wat van dat die is rollend rond in mijn hoofd voor de laatste paar weken, dat ik lijken niet te kunnen krijgen greep op:

â € œMatGB lijkt te hebben gesteld een Indiana Jones-achtige bal aan het rollen â € | Eerste ik het mee eens ben, voorlopig, voor de ondersteuning van een coalition of the willing te verwijderen onze gevaarlijk autoritaire regering, en nu hebben we een Britse grondwet inspanning.

Mijn antwoord is:

Een belangrijk aspect dat niet mag worden vergeten als WEA € ™ opnieuw te kijken naar dit niveau op een in het Verenigd Koninkrijk is de ongelijkheid veroorzaakt door de decentralisatie en vooral de Schotse Raj.
Zoals bisschop Hill zei (maar niet in deze woorden) gisteren hebben wij moeten heel voorzichtig over het maken van een Grondwet die de verankering van een partijdige politieke opvattingen. De EU-Grondwet, IMHO, maakte dat mistake.â €

Nog een opmerking over mijn deconstructie van professor hazelnoot rapport over Engels Vraag suggereert dat er geen koppeling tussen het decentralisatieproces en de EU Regionalisering.

Ik moet het ermee eens dat dit een veel aangevoerd argument van degenen die vreemd zijn ontvangers van EU-gave, die œincidentally ook ondersteuning en bevordering van het decentralisatieproces, met inbegrip van het uiteenvallen van Engeland in 9 aparte politieke regio's.

In principe is het Engels Vraag is om de problemen links van Tony Blair `s onvoltooide vernietiging van Groot-Brittannië als een politieke eenheid. Van Hazell `s oogpunt is er maar een antwoord op de vraag Engels, en dat is voor de vernietiging van Engeland, dat zonder twijfel zou een manier van het aanpakken van de problemen, maar als Hazell duidelijk maakt;

"Regionalisme is geen volledige Antwoord Schotland, Wales en Noord-Ierland hebben de bevoegdheid om wetten te maken in hun overgedragen samenstellingen en aanzienlijke uitvoerende bevoegdheden ten aanzien van belangrijke openbare diensten zoals gezondheidszorg, onderwijs en lokale overheid. Engels regionale assemblees zouden hebben geen wetgevende macht en geen uitvoerende bevoegdheden te spreken van ".

Maar terug naar de suggestie dat de EU niet relevant is voor het decentralisatieproces, we hebben niet ver te zoeken overweldigende bewijzen te vinden in officiële en academische rapporten, die de leugen op deze suggestie.

Regio's in de Europese Unie
Door Michael Keating *

"Europese integratiebeleid is een krachtige stimulans voor territoriale mobilisatie in West-Europa, maar tegelijkertijd heeft het nieuwe mechanismen voor het beheer van de gevolgen. De uitholling van de staatssoevereiniteit en het delen van de macht die zij oplegt voor een meer flexibele grondwettelijke volgorde waarin onderwerpen van bevoegdheid geen absolute zekerheden, maar kan worden onderhandeld. In multinationale staten, zoals Spanje, België en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, dit heeft toegestaan dat een programma van decentralisatie en een zekere mate van erkenning van de bijzondere behoeften van bepaalde gebieden, binnen het algemene kader van Europa. "

Martin Burch, Ricardo Gomez, Simon Bulmer (University of Manchester),
Patricia Hogwood (University of Glasgow), Caitriona Carter en Andrew
Scott (University of Edinburgh)
Het Engels's en de Europese Unie

Paper No 2
Decentralisatie en de Europese Unie beleidsvorming Series
14 mei 2003

"Sub-nationale betrokkenheid bij het EU-beleid en de politiek is een vast onderdeel van de
Europese integratieproces. In de loop van enkele decennia, de interactie tussen
verschillende niveaus van de overheid binnen en buiten de nationale staat heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een van de typische kenmerken van de EU. "

Maar in hoeverre is er bij de EU beïnvloed en gedreven het beleid van decentralisatie?

Ten eerste moeten we de definitie van "de EU-effect". Dat is de verandering die niet zou zijn gebeurd of niet zou zijn gebeurd in de manier waarop zij, ware het niet dat het bestaan van de EU of regelingen en interactie als gevolg van de oprichting en groei van de EU.

Hoe heeft de EU haar invloed uitgeoefend op deze ontwikkelingen, voor een officieel antwoord op die vraag moeten we alleen ingaan op het eindverslag aan het Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) en het Bureau van de vice-premier (ODPM) December 2003

â € œThe Structuurfondsen zijn het voornaamste instrument voor de uitvoering van het EU-regionaal beleid in de lidstaten. Ze werden aanvankelijk ontworpen en hebben zich vervolgens geëvolueerd om rekening te houden met de belangrijkste EU-beleidsprioriteiten,
De structuurfondsen hebben een specifieke opdracht aan te vullen lidstaat regionale
ontwikkelingsbeleid, maar er zijn verschillen in nadruk en enige ruimte voor
Europese middelen invloed uit te oefenen op nationale uitgaven prioriteiten:

De Europese Commissionâ € ™ s rol als partner in de uitvoering van de
Structuurfondsen betekent dat het perspectief op de belemmeringen voor de ontwikkeling in een
name op programma-gebied, en de nodige oplossingen, kan invloed uitoefenen op de natuur
van strategieën die zijn adopted.â €

Dus het antwoord op de vraag is geld of de beschikbaarheid van de middelen rechtstreeks uit de EU (natuurlijk is dit ons geld in de eerste plaats, waarbij de EU vervolgens terugkeert naar ons met strijkers gevoegd, teneinde de EU-doelstellingen,)

Dit is niet helemaal het einde van de zaak echter zoals in het verslag wordt voortgezet;

â € œThe verplichte gebruik van binnenlandse financieringsbronnen aan wedstrijd-fonds of een co-financiering
Structuurfondsprogramma's, en de wens van de kant van regionale en andere
actoren het maximaliseren van de â € ~ putten downâ € ™ uit de structuurfondsen, heeft de potentie om
beinvloeden binnenlandse fondsen zijn deployed.â €

Dus niet alleen de EU-financiering invloed regionaal beleid dat zij van invloed zijn onze eigen regering uitgaven.

Michael Keating
â € œThe Europese Commissie is van mening dat het vermogen van de structuurfondsen invloed uit te oefenen op de ontwikkeling van het beleid in de lidstaten om rekening te houden met de EU te helpen realiseren en om op te treden als stimulans voor een sterkere integratie van het beleid in de hele EU is een van de belangrijkste gebieden waarop de communautaire toegevoegde waarde kan worden identified.â €

Terug naar het Engels De Regio's en de Europese Unie, papier en een vraag van de relatieve betekenis:

De verschijning van de "New Engels regionalisme": 1991-97
â € œPrior tot en met 1997, de regionale betrokkenheid bij de Europese Unie beleidsvorming was echt een
â € ~ bottom Upa € ™ ontwikkeling. In sommige regio's de belangrijkste actoren begon zichzelf te organiseren om
reageren op de uitdagingen van de economische revitalisering en in het bijzonder voor de kansen van de Europese financiering programmes.â €

De schrijvers beweren hier dat er sprake was van een bottom-up beweging voor decentralisatie, maar zeggen dat het werd gedreven ", in het bijzonder door de Europese financieringsprogramma's". Welke ze lijken te hebben gemist was een top-down-verkeer en dus ook de driver voor de latere bottom-up beweging.

Naar Keating, die zegt:

â € œThe hele beleid was om zich te laten leiden door het beginsel van subsidiariteit, met de grootst mogelijke betrokkenheid van regionale en lokale belangen en de sociale partners in de wereld van het bedrijfsleven, de arbeidsmarkt en groepen vrijwilligers. De Commissie zal, in lijn met hedendaagse ideeën over het ontwikkelingsbeleid, ook geprobeerd om te verhuizen van infrastructuur aan menselijk kapitaal, productieve investeringen en endogene ontwikkeling, waarbij de mogelijkheden voor een meer actieve en participerende rol voor de regionale actoren van de verschillende soorten.

Dit moet ertoe hebben aangezet tot grotere regionale betrokkenheid bij de beleidsvorming en sterkere directe koppelingen tussen de Commissie en de regionale belangen, en in zekere mate dit is gebeurd. Staten zonder regionale structuren hebben gehad om ze te maken, of een ieder geval een aantal substituut voor hen, om in aanmerking te komen voor fundsâ € "bijvoorbeeld in Griekenland, Ierland en Zweden. De nieuwe fondsen hebben een grote politieke mobilisatie (Hooghe 1996) zelfs in landen als Engeland, zonder een ontwikkeld regionalisme (Burch en Holliday 1993). Er is een explosie van lobbying en regionale kantoren in Brussel. Regionale actoren zijn in aanraking met ambtenaren van de Commissie en haar ideeën over het ontwikkelingsbeleid is verspreid via het mechanisme van partnershipâ €

So we can see it was the EU decision to only offer funding to regions and not to nation states, which drove the devolution process from the very beginning, in order for the regions to receive funding there had to be a political mechanism in place, first to apply for and then to distribute funding.

This fact is confirmed in the paper The English Regions and the European Union,

it is important to acknowledge the significance of the structural funds in encouraging the emergence of sub-national governance in England.â€

“Two principles introduced in the 1988 and 1993 reforms to the European Regional Development Fund – partnership and programming – highlight this point. The partnership concept, incorporated in the 1988 Framework Regulation, codified a Commission commitment to the inclusion of sub-national actors that had existed since the foundation of EU regional policy in the 1970s. It required tripartite consultation between the Commission, Member States and designated sub-national authorities in the formulation of development plans, the implementation of programmes and the monitoring and evaluation process. Power to designate and to take key decisions about the programmes rested with central governments. But the partnership principle clearly encouraged sub-national participation and assisted the creation of new, regionally focused, policy communities (Bache 1998: 103). The programming concept complemented partnership by setting out a procedural map for the negotiation of multi-annual plans and there were, in particular, two aspects of this which encouraged the emergence of regional players and structures. Firstly, implementing authorities had to be consulted by the Commission and member
governments during this complex and lengthy process. Secondly, the 5-year time frame of the plans ensured continuity and stability for the participants in the funding process. The series of reforms to the ERDF between 1988 and 1993 thus provided one of the significant drivers for regional engagement, albeit with varying outcomes across the English regions partly depending on the scale of the funds allocated.â€

Elsewhere in the report;

“Regional differences in receipts of Structural Funds have clearly been a factor in accounting for the way organisational structures have developed.â€

And

Conclusion
There was considerable variation in the way that English regions became engaged on the European issue in the pre-1997 ‘phase’. This variation in part reflected differences in the pattern of regional emergence across the nine. A pragmatic ‘new English regionalism’emerged in some areas. This emphasised economic concerns, was confined to core elites and reflected the specific characteristics of each region. It developed in tandem with the creation of integrated Government Offices in the regions. However, the timing, scope and impact of change in English regional governance was significantly driven by the Structural Funds and thus by the European Union.

Much of the substantive change over the period originated at the regulative level
with the new obligations imposed on central government and regional authorities by the Structural Funds regulations of 1988 and 1993. Important changes in processes and
organisations within the regions were a direct result of ERDF decision-making
requirements. The programming concept helped to both develop and consolidate the
regional tier by creating a clear focus for the activities of regional players. Formal requirements to operate on the basis of partnership also exerted a powerful regionalising effect by forcing those actors involved in delivering Structural Funds programmes to devise new ways of working with sub-national interests.

This I think and hope puts an end to the suggestion that the EU has nothing to do with the devolution process or the break up of England into 9 separate political regions, it is patently was and still is an EU driven movement towards an EU of the regions. Which in its most radical understanding, implies the dissolution of the nation-state as most of the central government functions are started to be carried out by the EU and regional and local authorities.

How I woke up to a nightmare plot to steal centuries of law and liberty

From the Times
By
Daniel Finkelstein

THE POINT IS, I don’t want to seem like a nutter. It’sa very common human emotion, that — not wanting to stand out for thinking something hardly anyone else thinks. Best keep your head down and say nothing. In 1978, in Jonestown, Guyana, more than 900 people voluntarily drank strawberry-coloured poison and died, each one following his neighbour, eager not to refuse the drink and have his neighbour think that he was a nutter. Perhaps the worst part of the tragedy is that the rest of us look back at them and think — what a bunch of nutters.
So I’m nervous about admitting that I’ve been having a paranoid nightmare, one that very few other people seem to share. But I have been, so you may as well know about it.

In my nightmare, Tony Blair finally decides that he is fed-up with putting Bills before Parliament. He has so much to do and so little time. Don’t you realise how busy he is? He’s had enough of close shaves and of having to cut short trips abroad. He decides to put a Bill to End All Bills before the Commons, one that gives him and his ministers power to introduce and amend any legislation in future without going through all those boring stages in Parliament.

That’s not the end of my feverish fantasy. The new law is proposed and hardly anyone notices. John Redwood complains, of course, and a couple of Liberal Democrats, but by and large it is ignored. The Labour rebels are nowhere to be seen. The business lobby announces that it is about time all those politicians streamlined things, cutting out time-wasting debates. In a half empty Commons chamber, a junior minister puts down any objections with a few partisan wisecracks. Then the Bill to End All Bills is nodded through the Houses of Parliament, taking with it a few hundred years of Parliamentary democracy.

I wake up, sweating.

Only one thing persuades me that I’m not cracking up. When I have my nightmares about the Bill to End All Bills, I am not dreaming about dastardly legislation that I fear a cartoon Tony Blair, with an evil cackle, will introduce in some terrible future. I am tossing and turning about a government Bill that was given its second reading in the House of Commons last week and is heading into committee.

Now I know what I am about to tell you is difficult to believe (Why isn’t this on the front pages? Where’s the big political row?) but I promise you that it is true. The extraordinary Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, currently before the House, gives ministers power to amend, repeal or replace any legislation simply by making an order and without having to bring a Bill before Parliament. The House of Lords Constitution Committee says the Bill is “of first-class constitutional significance†and fears that it could “markedly alter the respective and long standing roles of minister and Parliament in the legislative process†.

There are a few restrictions — orders can’t be used to introduce new taxes, for instance — but most of the limitations on their use are fuzzy and subjective. One of the “safeguards†in the Bill is that an order can impose a burden only “proportionate to the benefit expected to be gained†. And who gets to judge whether it is proportionate? Why, the minister of course. The early signs are not good. Having undertaken initially not to use orders for controversial laws, the Government has already started talking about abstaining from their use when the matter at hand is “highly†controversial.

Now, I am not an extreme libertarian. I don’t spend my weekends in conferences discussing the abolition of traffic lights and the privatisation of MI5. But I have to admit that the legislation being debated in the Commons this week — the new ID cards, the smoking ban, the measure on the glorification of terror — has tempted me to take up smoking and start attending lectures about Hayek organised by earnest men with pamphlets in carrier bags.

Yet the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill has made me realise that I may be missing the point — the biggest danger to civil liberties posed by these new laws is not the nature of them, but merely their quantity.

Let me explain my thinking.

The Government claims that it has no malign intention in introducing the reform to parliamentary procedures. It is just that it has such ambitious plans for deregulation — or “better regulation†as it rather suspiciously calls it — that Parliament won’t be able to cope. The previous Regulatory Reform Act, passed in 2001, was so hedged around with conditions and safeguards that it took longer to produce a regulatory reform order than it did to produce a Bill. So this time, the Government wants more sweeping powers.

During future detailed Commons consideration of the Bill, restrictions on the terms of the new orders will be resisted using the argument that business wants deregulation and government has to get on with it.

What does this argument, used often by the minister during last week’s debate, amount to? An admission that we are now passing so many new laws, so quickly, and so many of them are sloppy, that we don’t have time to debate them properly or reform them when they go wrong. Parliament is drowning in a sea of legislation. Instead of calling a halt to this, the Government is seeking a way of moving ever faster, adding yet more laws, this time with even less debate.

The problem with ID cards, smoking bans and new terror laws is not just the standard liberal one. It isn’t even that they are entirely unecessary, since you can fashion an argument for each measure. It is that we should be reforming and enforcing the laws we have, rather than adding new complicated, poorly thought through laws to the stack that already exists. The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill isn’t just a dangerous proposal. It is a flashing red light.
Our legislative activism is endangering our parliamentary democracy and we must stop before it’s too late.

Or am I a nutter?

And from the house of Commons.

David Howarth (Cambridge) (LD)ï ŒCol 1094) I confine my remarks to the constitutional aspects of the Bill. This seems to me to be extraordinary legislation. It proposes changes to the legislative process that in any other country in Europe, and perhaps in the world, would require a constitutional amendment. That is one of the reasons that part 1 has to be taken on the Floor of the House.

One aspect of the Bill that seems quite disturbing is that it allows not just the addition of new crimes, with up to two years imprisonment or a level 5 fine, but it allows the Government to use the procedure to undertake structural change. Often, legislation does not regulate or add crimes, but sets up bodies and gives them powers. Among those bodies are, of course, local authorities. It strikes me that under the Bill as presently drafted, structural and functional reform of local government could be achieved without proper legislative scrutiny. Therefore, simply through using that mechanism, the balance of the constitution itself between local and central Government could be changed.

The Government will say, “Would that not be controversial?” That comes back to the point about the weakness of that test. Even the structure of the courts could be changed because they are no longer a matter of common law; they are a matter of statute. Any creature of statute, which technically includes any company, could be changed by these provisions……….

………The Minister has dealt with questions about changes to the Terrorism Bill, bringing back the 90 days detention without trial and the rights of defendants being changed. He says that, obviously, those are highly controversial, and they are, but the questions remain not just about fundamental rights, but about the structure of the constitution itself, which the Bill appears to allow to be changed.

Mr. Douglas Carswell (Harwich) (Con): (Col 1097) Part 1 enables Ministers to reform legislation or implement recommendations of the Law Commission by order. Law would, in effect, be made without reference to democratically elected parliamentarians. There would be a further extension of the power of a remote Executive and unaccountable national regulators. Merging regulators does not lead to less regulation. It was Max Weber who said as early as the 19th century that bureaucracy has an inherent tendency to expand. Bureaucracy tries to assume new powers, and to aggrandise itself. A merging of regulators could simply create new super-regulators, hungry for yet more power and more prone to regulate. I am concerned that part 1 will be a further step away from proper parliamentary scrutiny. It appears to empower the Executive, but in reality it will empower senior civil servants and those bureaucrats and regulators already beyond meaningful parliamentary accountability.

In the past 30 years, we have seen a steady erosion of representative parliamentary government. Behind the fac”ade of a functioning parliamentary democracy is an increasingly post-representative system of government. In almost every sphere—financial service regulation, food standards, environmental protection—it is remote quangos, not parliamentarians, that increasingly call the shots. Remote elites make the decisions; local people take the rap; no one is accountable; no one gets sacked: this is how we are governed today. I fear that this Bill is not so much anti-regulation as anti-democratic.

Speaking as someone who could be characterised as slightly sceptical about the European project, part 3 of the Bill leaves me somewhat suspicious. Not for the first time, measures are being introduced in the name of streamlining, but I fear that they may turn out to be a power-grab. European law is currently introduced into this country through regulation. This Bill could enable Brussels diktats to be brought in through schemes and rules. What does that mean? Yesterday in this House, one Member spoke about the European Union achieving the so-called Lisbon agenda. Remember that? It was about deregulating in order to make Europe competitive. Reference was made at the time to making Europe the most competitive economy in the world. That may seem absurd now. Easing EU institutions’ ability to make our laws for us will only exacerbate the Euro-sclerosis afflicting that tired old continent. Easing such ability will only tie us closer to those worn-out EU economies; it will only place us more firmly in Europe’s economic sarcophagus.

I welcome the Regulatory Reform Committee’s acknowledgement that, far from being about deregulation and tidying up, this Bill
“has the potential to be the most constitutionally significant Bill that has been brought before Parliament for some years.”

I welcome the recognition that the driving force behind it is the Cabinet Office and, perhaps, senior civil servants. It could become a bureaucrats’ charter: it could allow them to avoid the messy and unpredictable business of having their measures scrutinised by the people’s elected representatives. Yes, Minister, this Bill could be Sir Humphrey’s dream come true. The Minister would be able to amend, repeal and replace primary and secondary legislation without reference to this House.

It was Walter Bagehot who said in the 19th century that the Crown had ceased to be part of what he called the efficient part of the constitution and had become the dignified part. By that, he meant that it had the trappings of power, but not the reality. My fear is that although this democratically elected Parliament has the trappings of power here in our ornate Chamber, real power is increasingly moving elsewhere. This Bill will only exacerbate that process.

Mr Djanolgy: (Col 1100). The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said that part 1 is unacceptable as it stands, and we agree.

Part 3 of the Bill relates to legislation emanating from the EU. We have said that we support the idea of making it easier for UK institutions to deal with EU legislation, but—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham and my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich asked—how will that actually work? As my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire asked, what are the rules and schemes for EU law referred to in the Bill? We need to know.

The Bill has a striking resemblance to parts of other Bills before this House and the other place. Those need to be looked at in context to highlight the growing constitutional trend away from primary legislation. The Company Law Reform Bill and the Government of Wales Bill both include a similar means of introducing orders through forms of delegated legislation

From the letters page in the Times some voices of concern.

This ID card infringes fundamental freedoms

Sir, Most unusually, you have allowed yourself to be misled by the Government’s spin and misrepresentations concerning the ID Card Bill — principally by swallowing its contention that the privacy concerns of many people in the UK are “in contemporary, card-carrying Britain, entirely irrelevant†. (leading article, Feb 13, and letter, Feb 14).

Those concerns are not in relation to the simple carrying of a card, which is merely the physical expression of the system the Government proposes to impose upon us. My deep anxiety, shared by many others, is the national identity register (NIR) — the database behind the cards — which has been too little debated and which appears to be widely misunderstood.

Leave aside for the moment the questions of overall cost, of the level of charge to be paid by the citizen, of the reliability of the biometric technology to be used, of the burden placed on those whose iris or facial scans do not readily “fit†(such as people with some disabilities and from certain ethnic groups) or of the Government’s abysmal record in implementing any project involving computer technology on time and within budget.

My principal objection is that the Government cannot make up its mind what the ID card and NIR are supposed to accomplish and cannot produce convincing evidence that any of its aims will be achieved by the scheme as outlined in the Bill. We have been told at various times that ID cards and the NIR will help to reduce benefit fraud, cut illegal immigration, combat identity theft, become a vital tool in the war on terror or be a major aid to the police in fighting crime. Yet each of these supposed benefits has been challenged, often by those best able to judge.

I remain deeply sceptical that ID cards and the NIR will achieve any of their stated aims. Against this, I balance the fundamental shift in the relationship between individual and State, the scope for error and maladministration, the horrendous costs of setting up and running the scheme and have come to the inescapable conclusion that the whole concept is flawed and must be resisted by every legal means.
JON MILES
Newton Abbot, Devon

Sir, I feel that I am sensible enough to look after my own identity and take necessary measures to that effect, which is my responsibility.
Now I am being forced to put my identity, along with various measurements of parts of my body, on to a national database where I have little control over the access, use or security of my identity.
MATTHEW HALL
Newcastle upon Tyne

Sir, The decision taken by members of parliament shows them to be as unworthy as representatives of the people as were their predecessors whom Cromwell was compelled to remove in the 17th century.

Is it not obvious that the growing certainty of compulsory ID cards and its associated database, together with the surveillance state represented by more CCTV cameras than are used by Communist China, has placed us well down the road to the nightmare world of 1984? Who can doubt that the distortion of language embodied in political correctness is a precursor to the imposition of a form of Newspeak.

It beggars belief that the British people, at the behest of the lobby fodder within the Commons, are to be forced to submit their fingerprints and iris patterns for inclusion in a state-run archive and to become accountable to those who for so many centuries have been accountable to us.

What foreign dictators have failed to do we are now doing to ourselves.
COLIN BULLEN
Tonbridge, Kent

Sir, It was William Pitt the Younger who said: “Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves.â€

What Britons never, never shall be, they have become. A fundamental freedom was lost when compulsory ID cards were voted for.
DÓNAL THOMPSON
Madrid

Slaves we are certainly becoming, this Statewatch report shows that at an EU level this is being driven by the British government, directly from Tony Blair`s sofa cabinet. Even the EUites are concerned about “the legal bases for such action”
According to Statewatch

“At the end of January the Commission published its 128-page work programme for 200
6: European Commission work programme for 2006: Justice and home affairs issues. Hidden in the detail is the following:

“Adoption par la Commission d’une décision établissant des normes pour les éléments de sécurité à intégrer dans les cartes d’identité (Comité Article 6)”

That is to adopt a Commission Decision to establish standards for security in ID cards. The “Brief description” attached is more explicit:

“Brief Description: According to The Hague Action Plan, travel documents both for third country nationals and EU citizens should be better secured in particular via the integration of biometric identifiers. Also Identity Cards have been explicitly mentioned even if there are doubts about the legal bases for such an action. This proposal responds to this request and will harmonise the security features for ID cards issued by Member States” (emphasis added)

There is, of course, a big difference between simply “harmonising” security features in national ID cards and “the integration of biometric identifiers” (see, below for objections to this approach).

Two other aspects are extraordinary about this proposal. First, the open admission that there are doubts about: “the legal bases for such action”. Not surprising as Article 18.3 TEC (Nice) expressly excludes provisions on national ID cards.

Second, because the Commission does not appear to be intending to draft a proposal for consideration by the Council and European Parliament but rather to take this momentous decision in secret committee - the Article 6 Committee, referred to as a “Technical Committee”.

The Commission’s intention is all the more surprising as exactly this issue was the subject of heated discussion in the Council prior to the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 1 December 2005.

“The story starts back in July when the UK Presidency presented a Note on “Minimum common standards for national identity cards” to SCIFA (Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum) (EU doc no: 11092/05). The Note called on SCIFA to ask the Article 6 Committee to draft standards including the “use of biometrics”. This “Article 6 Committee” is a technical committee set up by the Commission to work out the implementation of the uniform visa format in 1995 - but what powers are there to extend the Committee’s remit first to residence permits for third country nationals, then to EU passports and now to EU ID cards? As the original purpose of the Committee was to deal with the uniform visa format, on the the European Parliament was only “consulted”, it appears the parliament has no right to see what is happening on all the other issues too. See: EU: Biometrics - from visas to passports to ID cards.

The proposal surfaced again in November 2005 when the UK Presidency sent another Note to SCIFA on 11 November (EU doc no: 14351/05). The Article 6 Committee had “considered” physical security features and produced “interim conclusions” and in parallel “an ad-hoc group of experts from Member States” produced its “conclusions”. SCIFA was “invited” to agree “Conclusions” with a view to their adoption “in the margins” (as an A Point - adopted without discussion) at the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA Council) on 1 December 2005.

The opening Recitals in the Conclusions plainly show the lack of a legal basis. No legally binding standards or timetables could be “imposed” on member states - “Conclusions” are anyway “soft”, non-binding law which have to be agreed unanimously. This is followed by “without prejudging the issue of the possible legal basis” to “harmonise” security standards for national identity cards - in plain language this means that there is no legal basis but if common standards including biometrics are adopted by member states one-by-one (independently as it were) then “harmonisation” can follow later (a common tactic for controversial measures).

The Conclusions contained two elements, first, standards related to the “issuing process” (eg: applicants should appear in person, security of data and storage). Second, the introduction of biometrics identifiers (”face and two fingerprints”) incorporated into a radio frequency chip (RFID) which should follow the specifications for passports “without modification” - this proved to be controversial. Also by the back-door the Conclusions set standards for checking applicants data “against existing databases” for example, “civil registers, passport and identity cards databases or driving licence registers”.

A week later (18 November) a Note (EU doc no: 14622/05) from the UK Presidency to COREPER (the permanent committee based in Brussels of high-level officials from the 25 governments) said SCIFA “had reached agreement on most of the issues” and it was invited to:

“examine the only outstanding issue, which concerns a reservation by Belgium”

The final version, dated 25 November 2005 (EU doc no: 15000/05), had highly significant changes concerning biometrics. Member states could choose whether they wanted to have biometrics on national ID cards and the passport biometric standards were now only a “reference point” or “starting point”. All references to fingerprints and RFID chips were deleted.

“Belgium and the Czech Republic consider that the introduction of biometric data into national identity cards cannot be examined only from the technical angle. The question requires a wide-ranging debate, which includes the protection of the private life [privacy], budgetary and organisational aspects”

It is interesting to note that while the Conclusions were published in the official press release of the JHA Council on 1 December the statement by Belgium and the Czech Republic was not JHA press release, 1 December 2005.

Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, comments:

“This is no way to try to bring in such a far-reaching policy, one which will affect millions of people. It is particularly objectionable that the Commission appears to be proposing that the introduction of biometrics on national ID cards should be considered as a “technical” issue by a committee whose actions cannot be scrutinised. By-passing national and European parliamentary scrutiny, let alone civil society, has no place in a democracy”

In our own parliament the real culprits for the decimation of our constitution, have been debating ID Cards again before the vote later this week.

First, on the so called voluntary introduction of the system; is seems that the government proposes to initially allow a “voluntary†take up of the cards, at some point to be determined later, it is proposed to bring in compulsion. The idea being that if enough of the people prove to be open to the system by taking out the cards on a voluntary basis then the government would make it compulsory.

In fact in the Labour manifesto states “We will introduce ID cards, including biometric data like fingerprints, backed up by a national register and rolling out initially on a voluntary basis as people renew their passports.”

The problem is that the government want to make it a condition that you must take the ID Card when you apply for a new or to renew your passport. This clause was removed by the House of Lords but has been put back into the bill by the government.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury put the matter nicely when he moved the amendment in the Lords. He stated:
“We seek to replace compulsion by voluntarism. Citizens should not be forced to have ID cards. Compulsion is far too often resorted to by the modern state. That comes from an intensely managerial culture in which regulation rules. That sits uneasily with fundamental rights such as privacy and voluntarism. This Bill is an authentic clash between such rights and managerial efficiency.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2006; Vol. 677, c. 957.]

Baroness Scotland, speaking on behalf of the Government, tried to claim that passports are voluntary. Well they are but by the government linking the card scheme to passports means that to avoid being compelled to take an ID card you become a prisoner in this country with no opportunity to travel on business or for pleasure. Also as over 80% of us do carry a passport the governments chosen trigger for compulsion would soon be reached.

David Davis made points about the national register;

There are many good reasons for not wanting to be on the national identity register, which involves a large number of pieces of data about each individual being put on a single Government database, many of them the access keys for other Government databases. That is the important point: it is a central database with access keys effectively to all the other Government databases.

It is disingenuous of the Home Secretary to say, “We’ve already got all those.” One of the transitions that has taken place over the past several years under the Government, and to a small extent under the previous Government too, is the removal of barriers to the transfer of information around Government. Those barriers were a protection of the liberties of the individual, and now they have gone. Many have gone for good reason—to make the Child Support Agency work, to stop terrorism, and so on—and the Bill will accelerate that process.

Finally, there is the most important question about the whole issue—the insecurity of the system. The Government have made, in a way properly, much of the issue of identity theft, particularly with regard to terrorism. Yet their proposal—a point I referred to earlier—is to gather the access keys to virtually every Government database in the national identity register, put them on one large computer and then create many thousands of direct access points to that computer. They will have created the most attractive possible target for every fraudster, terrorist, confidence trickster and hacker on the planet. Those people will be able to lift data out and put viruses and false data in.

If the Pentagon and Microsoft cannot keep hackers from penetrating their mainframes, what chance the Home Office? Speaking about the scheme, Microsoft’s national technology officer has said that a central identity database could worsen the very problems that it was intended to prevent, such as terrorism and identity theft. He said that

“ministers should not be building systems that allow hackers to mine information so easily.”

So, far from protecting the public, the Government will put the individual citizen at risk by creating a culture of complacency that is based on an ill-designed and ill-thought-out scheme.

Incidentally, this is yet another area where the Government mounted a mendacious attack on the independent LSE report. I will deal with that in detail because it is rather important. The section of the report that highlights the very serious security flaws in the proposed system was written not by an antagonist of the identity card system, but by somebody who favours identity cards, Dr. Brian Gladman, the ex-technical director of NATO, who had an eminent career in the British military ensuring the security of our military computer systems. He himself has said:

“the UK ID cards programme as now envisaged will create safety and security risks for those whose details are entered into the system.”—

that from an avowed supporter of ID cards.

The English Question
Thanks to the Blog Great Britian not Little England for the link to this report from Publius: The Journal of Federalism by Robert Hazell.

Devolution to Scotland and Wales throws up related questions about the government of
England. Does England need to find its own separate political voice? Does England too need devolution? There is little demand for an English parliament. ‘‘English votes on English laws’’ commands more support but would be impossible to implement in practice. Despite the setback of the Northeast referendum defeat, the future will see further development of regionalism in England. Regional government is the only institutional solution that could help to give England a louder voice and also help to decentralize the government of England. But it is not inevitable. There is no logic in the process of devolution that requires the English to have devolution too.

England is the gaping hole in the devolution settlement. Some argue that devolution will not be complete, and the settlement will not stabilize, until the English Question has been solved. Others believe that England can be left out indefinitely and devolution confined to the Celtic fringe. This article aims to explain the different formulations of the question and to analyse one by one the range of different answers.

The English Question can be divided into the following groups of subquestions:

1. Strengthening England’s place in the Union:
_ Does England need to find its own separate political voice, to rebalance the louder
10 political voice accorded to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland?
_ Could this be supplied by an English parliament, ‘‘English votes on English laws,’’
independence for England?

2. Decentralizing the government of England:
_ Does England too need devolution, to break from the excessive domination of the
15 central government in London?
_ Can this best be supplied by elected regional assemblies, administrative regionalism,
city regions, stronger local government, elected mayors?

3. Continuation of the status quo:
_ Or do the English want none of the above, with no separate representation or
20 political voice, and no share in devolution either?

These questions have come onto the political agenda as a result of devolution to
Scotland and Wales. They are big issues, issues that will determine the future shape
and nature of the United Kingdom as much as the future government of England.

Devolution has already profoundly changed the United Kingdom’s system of
government, but it extends to only 15 percent of the population. England, with
85 percent of the population, for the moment is left out. If the English ever choose to opt in, the choice they make will have huge consequences not only for the government of England but for the whole future of the Union.

As devolution was a top down exercise imposed and assisted by central government, it is wrong to now look for a grass roots movement calling for the English to opt in, the English preferred the status quo that was as part of one union, this union has now been partially dismantled.

This erroneous argument is followed through into the rest of the report; Hazell, it seems is quite happy to accept the results of the governments top down forcing of the issue in Scotland and Wales, but now asks the English people to start a grass roots movement in order for the English people to exhibit a desire for devolution.

Different Versions of the English Question

Improving the Government of England or Strengthening England’s
Place in the Union? The ‘‘purely English’’ version of the English Question asks: How can we improve the government of England? Interest in regionalism as a possible solution goes back to Fawcett (1919) and Cole (1947) (Tomaney, forthcoming). It springs from long- standing concerns about the poor performance of many of England’s regions,especially in the North, and the difficulties faced by central government in finding effective policy instruments and institutions to drive up regional economic
performance. Successive governments, Labour in the 1970s and Conservative in the1980s, had given up on local government as providing the solution because of its lack of political will and lack of effective capacity. More and more functions were
transferred from local government to centrally controlled public bodies, many
operating on a larger scale at regional rather than local level. In 1994 the Conservative government led by John Major took regionalism a step further by bringing together the regional outposts of four central government departments into new government offices for the regions, with common boundaries based on the Treasury’s eight standard regions of the Northeast, Northwest, Yorkshire and Humberside, West
Midlands, East Midlands, East Anglia, Southeast, and Southwest.

English masses show little concern about devolution in Scotland and Wales and no demand for devolution for themselves (Curtice 2001, 2006, forthcoming). In November 2004 that was dramatically confirmed by the ‘‘No’’ vote in the Northeast regional referendum, when the voters in the Northeast region rejected the government’s proposals for an elected regional assembly by four to one, despite strong campaigning by the deputy prime minister in this solidly Labour region.

The rejection of the government’s proposals is not evidence that that there is little concern about the devolution process, rather it is evidence that the governments proposals for regionalisation were unacceptable.

Prof. Hazell offers us some alternative roads forward and looks at the support both in elite circles and in the general public and the likelihood that any of them may be adopted.

An English Parliament which has low support and an English parliament would risk being as overburdened as Westminster and equally remote. More on this later

English votes on English laws which has good support 60% in England and 50% in Scotland which might be because it was Conservative party policy

English independence which has negligible support. Hard to envisage England unilaterally declaring independence from rest of the United Kingdom

Decentralize government of England regional assemblies

Hazell claims this has a 25% support with the public, considering the only area that was allowed a referendum; the NE rejected the proposals by a 4/1 margin I cannot see how this figure can be supported, opinion polling perhaps, but that ignores the NE result which showed the polling to be totally out of touch with the real answer at the referendum. And a point Hazell makes later on the issue of Local mayors.

Administrative regionalism
This is regionalisation by the back door ie. Regional chambers exist, and powers and functions slowly growing and of course is Labour party policy with little public knowledge.

City regions
this has minimal support and apparently need not cover whole of England

Revive local government
Politicians all pay lip service; no party has strong proposals Public seem to share some of national politicians’ mistrust of local government competence

Elected mayors
Low. Very little support among local councillors High in opinion polls, less when tested in local referenda Might also be linked to city regions.

Having posed his questions the professor now attempts to answer them;

An English Parliament
An English parliament would appear to be a neat solution to the fundamental asymmetry in the devolution arrangements. It would create a federation of the four historic nations of the United Kingdom, each with its parliament enjoying significant devolved powers.

But it is one thing to create such a federation, quite another to make it work. The fundamental difficulty is the sheer size of England by comparison with the rest of the United Kingdom. England, with four-fifths of the population, would be hugely dominant.

On most domestic matters the English parliament would be more important than the Westminster parliament. No federation has operated successfully where one of the units is so dominant.

I find these arguments to be less than compelling, of course the English parliament would be more important on domestic issues than Westminster, that is the idea behind devolution in the first place. Is the Scottish parliament not more important than Westminster on domestic issues.

If the size issue is important and means the new federation would not work then how are we to understand the EU were Germany with 82.5 million and France with 59.9 million massively outnumber Malta with 398,534 or Cyprus with 780,133. So how is it that an English parliament would unbalance a proposed UK federation when this does not seem to matter at the EU level.

Professor Hazell does make one good point about an English Parliament here that he seems to dismiss on other points and that is; “Perhaps because of this lack of elite support, mass support for the idea of an English parliament remains low and shows no sign of increasing.†Not only is there no elite political support, but this follows through into the main stream media, there is also no coverage for an English parliament, in fact the only real coverage is for regionalisation regional assemblies.

English Votes on English Laws: Westminster as a Proxy for an English Parliament
In contrast, English votes on English laws is a proposition that does command some
elite support and considerable mass support. Polling data consistently show that
between 50 and 60 percent of people in England agree that Scottish MPs should no
longer be allowed to vote on English laws now that Scotland has its own parliament
It seems only logical and fair, since English MPs can no longer vote on matters devolved to Scotland. Even a majority of Scots support restricting the voting rights of Scottish MPs in this way (Curtice 2001, 234). But the difficulties of implementing such a policy seem insuperable, at both a technical and a political level.

Proffor Hazell says; The technical difficulty is identifying those English laws on which only English MPs would be allowed to vote Strictly speaking there is no such thing as an English law, in the sense of a Westminster statute that applies only to England.

That is a point, however it would be quite feasible to note which particular laws did not apply to Scotland because that power had been devolved to the Scotish parliament.

On the political front Hazell sees even more problems;

“Proponents of English votes on English laws tend to underestimate just what a huge change would be involved. It would create two classes of MP, ending the traditional reciprocity whereby all members can vote on all matters. It would effectively create a parliament within a parliamentâ€

Well yes of course it would be a huge change, but then the problem has been brought about by the devolution process itself a huge change, which has created a problem in that Scottish MPs can vote on proposals which have no affect on their own constituents. So we already have two classes of MP`s those that are accountable and those that are not.

The UK government might not be able to command a majority for its English business, leading to great political instability.

I do not see this as a great problem if not enough English MP`s are prepared to vote for a policy that only affects England then that policy fails.

English votes on English laws would suddenly become a critical issue if (as
may happen) after a future election Labour formed a government with a narrow
majority and depended on Scottish and Welsh MPs to get its legislation through.

Well this is exactly the point is it not, if the Labour party has to rely on Scots and Welsh MP`s voting for something that does not affect them then that is also wrong.

Hazlle says that :
The Conservatives have fought two elections on a platform of English votes on English laws (in 2001 and 2005) and have tried to arouse the English. The English have failed to respond. Although opinion polls show majority support for English votes on English laws, it is not a high-salience issue. It would become salient only if the government used the votes of Scottish and Welsh MPs to force controversial or unpopular measures upon the English. Its salience would depend on how the media reported parliamentary votes upon the issue.

This issue was not at the forefront of either of the two elections mentioned, also the labour party is in power at Westminster only because of Scottish and Welsh votes.

Two Other Possible Answers to Votes on English Laws
Reduce the number of Scottish and Welsh MPs to reflect their reduced role at Westminster after devolution and more proportional voting system.

Neither of these options offer an answer to the west Lothian question, they only reduce the affects.

Independence for England
English independence is the third and most extreme institutional solution that would
ensure the English have a louder political voice. If it is impossible to give the English a political voice within the Union, the argument goes, they need to break free from the Union and establish their own English state.

This idea is dismissed out of hand because it has no elite support. However if the idea is to dismantle the UK as a political unit then perhaps support for this option might well be something that will grow in the future, especially if support were to grow for Scottish independence.

If the English Are Denied a Louder Political Voice, Does English Nationalism Need Some Other Outlet?

Identity and institutions mirror each other. Englishness is commingled with Britishness in the English people’s sense of identity and in their political institutions. To combine Englishness with Britishness is not necessarily a sign of confusion. It is a reflection of reality. We cannot readily disentangle Englishness from Britishness in our history or in our institutions. It is better to accept them for what they are, deeply intertwined, and to allow the English to celebrate being English and British. Their political allegiance is to Westminster.

There is a lot in this particular observation, the English as a rule do consider themselves British, the problem is that Britian itself is changing, and it is those forced changes which will put the English in a position of having to choose, would they prove willing to tolerate these political anomalies and suffer rough justice in their parliament, at the hands of the Scots and Welsh MP`s who do not have to face the consequences of their votes in their own constituencies.

The fact that the English consider Westminster as their parliament is very much dependant on that parliament being the “one parliament†for the whole of Britain, that is no longer the case, if the concept is Britishness is to be devalued, as this becomes ever more evident, then the English may well not be relied upon to accept the situation.

Elected Regional Assemblies
At the elite level, elected regional assemblies have been supported by Labour and the
Liberal Democrats but opposed by the Conservatives and by the business community.
Mass support has always been much harder to gauge, with some opinion surveys
suggesting quite high levels of support.

Then in November 2004 came the referendum result in the Northeast. The region
had been chosen by the government as the most likely to vote ‘‘Yes’’ to a regional
assembly because of its strong sense of regional identity, proximity to Scotland,
remoteness from London, and long history as a Labour heartland. Yet the
government’s proposals for an elected regional assembly were decisively rejected by
four to one, on a surprisingly high turnout of 48 percent.

This of course the Governments preferred option and the one that has already been set in motion by the establishments of a system of administrative regionalism. The people of the North East put a spoke in those plans to roll out elected assemblies. But of course this will not stop them passing ever more powers to the regional quangos in the hope that they can point to them in future referendum as being the de facto local government so we will be offered a choice of having elected representation at this level. We are already seeing more moves in this direction with the “restructuring†of police forces and fire Brigades.

Administrative regionalism describes the growing array of unelected government bodies that operate at the regional level. A dense network of policy actors has gradually grown up in each region around the three main pillars of the government office, regional development agency, and regional chamber. The government offices for the regions have become the main regional outposts of central government, with representatives from nine government departments. The regional development agencies have seen big increases in their budgets for economic development since their creation in 1999.

City Regions and Elected Mayors

City regions, sometimes linked to elected mayors, have never quite made it on to the political agenda….. Finally, some of the arguments advanced against city regions are similar to those advanced against regional assemblies: that they are essentially technocratic, of interest to elites not ordinary people, and at best a patchwork solution.

Neither do they answer the major problems caused by devolution.

Strengthening Local Government
The main alternative to regionalism as a policy solution for excessive centralization is to restore powers and functions to local government. Local government has become increasingly the creature of central government. The English structure of local government, with large county councils and smaller districts in rural areas and unitary 30 local authorities in most towns and cities, has been subjected to successive reorganizations since the 1970s that have left it battered and demoralized.

Quite, in its surge toward regional government or the break up of England if you prefer, central government has done everything it can to make life difficult for local government instead of supporting local government it has been steadily denuded of its powers which. There is very little likelihood of this trend changing because to do so would be to offer an alternative to the governments desire to break up England into regions.

Regionalism Remains the Best Answer to the English Question
Regional government in England is the only solution that offers an answer to both
versions of the English Question. It could help to give England a louder voice within
the Union, and it would help to decentralize the government of England. But it could
achieve the first aim, of giving England a louder voice, only if there were elected assemblies with strong powers and functions. The stronger the better. The stronger the powers, the louder would be England’s voice within the Union, because they would be a closer match for the much greater (although varying) powers given to the devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Well there is a surprise! I just did not see this coming.

But Regionalism Is Not a Complete Answer
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have powers to make laws in their devolved
assemblies and substantial executive powers over major public services such as health, education, and local government. English regional assemblies would have had no lawmaking power and no executive powers to speak of. The difference can be seen in
terms of their budgets. The budget of the Northeast assembly would have been thirty
times smaller than those of the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales. The
tiny budget reflects its strategic role, shorn of responsibility for any major public
service. It would require a revolution in thinking about regional government for it to be granted responsibility for a major public service with a big budget such as health or education. Such devolved responsibilities are not uncommon in the regions of Europe, but they are currently beyond the imagination of politicians in England.

Arrr.. the EU at last gets a mention, so far this report has not even touched on the EU involment with regionalisation, or the EU policy for regionalisation or the destruction of the nation state in favour of an EU of the regions.

How Might Regionalism Develop in Future?
Professor Hazell suggests there are three things which could influence the regionalisation development, “The first, top-0 down accelerator would be if the government decided to throw its weight more strongly behind regionalismâ€

I do not know how much stronger the professor thinks the government could be! it has ignored the referendum in the NE and is continuing its policy of creating more regional quangos as fast as it can.

The second, bottom-up set of forces would be a slower-burning fuse. It would depend upon the constitutional conventions that sprang up in five of the English regions to make plans for elected regional assemblies not giving up following the defeat in the Northeast but redoubling their efforts. Following the precedent of the Scottish Constitutional Convention, they might decide to come forward with their own proposals for a stronger set of powers and functions. They would need to be prepared for a seriously long march. In Scotland it took eighteen years. And although the Scots may not have appreciated it at the time, the eighteen years of Conservative rule at Westminster helped to fan the flames of devolution in Scotland. Another prolonged period of Conservative rule could similarly help to rekindle the cause of devolution in the northern regions of England.

The last point is taken care of by the third development which could have an effect on the regionalisation policy and possible stop it dead “Election of a Conservative government would stop the process,†This would seem to be a call to arm for all of us who stand against break up of England as a political unit.

To be honest although I find that Professor Hazell makes some interesting points, I feel that he dismisses the likely outfall, as the problems caused by devolution become more evident to the English people. This present government is perhaps storing up problems for its chances of re-election by pretending to ignore those problem, when Tony Blair says of the West Lothian question, “it has gone away†perhaps he is speaking more in hope than anything else.

Certainly the problems are being kept below the general horizon, even as the moves are being made to enhance the regional assemblies, but there are ever more of us who although we would prefer a British parliament for Britian, are willing to think about the alternatives if the Scots and the Welsh do wish to divorce from the union, and we are not thinking regional assemblies offer any sort answer for the voice of England. Regional Assemblies only make sense in an EU of the regions, when the Westminster parliament no longer has power and is only a talking shop.

I say that Professor Hazell has ignored the Elephant in the room the EU, that is the case in this particular report but elsewhere he said;

In practice many devolved competences have an EU dimension, including regional economic development, environment, agriculture and rural affairs, fisheries, and, in Scotland, justice and home affairs.

Then of course the whole idea of an independent Scotland was dependant on the EU, because the Scots were not calling for independence, but for independence within the EU. This is a totally different kettle of fish, take the EU out of the equation and Scotland would not be calling for independence in the first place. So it can be suggested that the existence of EU is the basic cause of the moves for devolution, and certainly for the break up of England.

We can debate the devolution process but not in isolation to the EU plans for a United States of Europe, or a Europe EU of the regions, which is separate and distinct from a Europe of nation states. Everything that has happened so far in the devolution process has been in line with the regionalisation of Britian and England as agreed at an EU level.

An English Parliament, English Votes on English Laws: Westminster as a Proxy for an English Parliament, Reviving local government, is just not part of those plans. In fact the only agreed plans are for the break up of England into regions this is something that this government is continuing to do by the back door.

Simon Jenkins is again having a go at Trial by jury in the Times today he says;

Jury trial has outlived its usefulness. To pretend that it delivers justice is absurd. This archaic theme park democracy is expensive, a waste of time and adds nothing to fair trial. Abolish it.

He cites as evidence for this call to abolish Trial by Jury two recent cases which have not gone the way he thinks proper;

Of the Abu Hamza trial he says;

In the first the trial of a man now known to have been a serious public menace was delayed for four years because the Crown Prosecution Service felt that the evidence of the police and MI5 was insufficient to get a jury conviction. And the Sion Jenkins case, here Simon Jenkins (no relation I assume) says After nine years, three trials, 700 witness statements and £10m in costs, the judicial system still cannot decide whether Jenkins killed his foster daughter, Billie-Jo.

Jenkins assumes that was why the CPS did not prosecute Abu Hamza, but it could equally have been because this Labour Government relies on a great many Muslim votes to keep them in office, and did not want to unset the apple cart.

Even if we accept Jenkins superstition, which is difficult even in his own terms, because he say now known to have been a serious public menace in other words that accusation has been tested in court, before then it was only an assumption.

In any event what is the alternative? That people be convicted without evidence or with a lower standard of evidence. And whose fault is it in the Jenkins case, if the prosecution cannot find the evidence to convince a jury, then obviously the evidence is lacking, here again Jenkins seems to be calling for conviction on a lower standard of evidence.

He then goes on to say;

No sooner was the Jenkins jury released and the accused formally acquitted than Thursday`s newspapers were filled with evidence that the jury had not been allowed to hear although it had been heard previously by Court of Appeal judges. This evidence, of violent rages suffered at Jenkins hands by his former wife, had been banned from disclosure at the trial as prejudicial (a word seemingly synonymous with relevant). The impact was to make the jury appear a bunch of dupes.

This is not a condemnation of trial by jury but of the legal professions own rules, which deny the jury the full information, originally up until the 17th century the jury would have made their own investigations and would not have been mere pawns in the professional game, to be spoon fed only the information decided by the judge. However even on that point; the reports that Jenkins suffered violent rages is not proof in itself that he murdered his foster daughter.

The fact the Charles Clarke is going to present arguments for the government to have the power to lock up people without trial since courts are slow and jurors may not convict is not an argument against trial by jury, it is in fact the very reason we need trial by jury.

Any government, that is its own judge of, and determines authoritatively for the people, what are its own powers over the people, is an absolute government of course. It has all the powers that it chooses to exercise. There is no other — or at least no more accurate — definition of a despotism than this. Spooner.

Jenkins claims in a case last year, where he was a juror, that the Judge suggested that the jury must acquit someone he believed to have been guilty the drift of the judge`s summing up was to the effect that the jury could only acquit. But this is not possible the judge cannot instruct a jury to find either way, Such was the case in the 1670 political trial of William Penn, who was charged with preaching Quakerism to an unlawful assembly. Four of the twelve jurors voted to acquit  and continued to acquit even after being imprisoned and starved for four days. Under such duress, most jurors paid the fines. However, one juror, Edward Bushell, refused to pay and brought his case before the Court of Common Pleas. As a result, Chief Justice Vaughan issued an historically-important ruling: that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. Bushell’s Case (1670) was one of the most important developments in the common-law history of the jury.

Of course this concept like all our defences against the state is now under attack from a government who would like to be the deciders of their own powers. Jenkins then is either a fool, or useful idiot working in the cause of those who would like establish authoritarianism in our courts.

Jenkins now goes on to offer more evidence for abolishing jury trial

“Juries try less than 2% of criminal cases. They are a judicial sideshow. Given the professed sanctity of the institution to lawyers it is a wonder that they accept the fairness of the remaining 98%.â€

Well there is that point, why should any of us accept the fairness of a system which decided on the evidence alone, that is one of the major benefits of the jury system it make the ordinary man or woman in the street the final arbiters of our law;

“For more than six hundred years — that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215 — there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary an